法拍門（foreclosure-gate）風波
2010年是迄今為止美國歷史上房屋法拍案件最多的一年，多到不少銀行僱用薪資較低、甚至没有房貸基本常識的人員，未嚴謹備齊程序上應該齊備無誤的相關文件，像機器人一樣（robo-signers）簽發法拍文件。媒體曾報導許多不可思議的錯誤與弊端：譬如申請法拍根本没有貸款或貸款已完全清償的住宅；申請法拍債權為別家銀行所有的房子；先生名下的住宅，先生過世後太太用自己的名字匯款，被認為没有繳款；有人旅行回來發現大門換了鎖，屋內傢俱被搬光；有的住戶明明在家，受僱查封換門鎖的合約商就換了門鎖把門鎖上；債務人根本没有收到法院出庭傳票就遭到缺席判決；偽簽債務人證言；銀行裡連一張屋主簽名的借款文件都没有也送件法拍；有的銀行偽造全套貸款文件；有的公司公然廣告可以幫銀行「重新找回」遺失的房貸文件；不少律師事務所人員對媒體表示，™™州的法拍案件95%以上都在法院人士協助下帶有欺偽情事…
債權人追債的演技通常都比債務人逃債的演技精采。
2010/04/27–旨在為銀行們排除法拍障礙的H.R. 3808號法案–Interstate
Recognition of Notarizations Act of 2010在眾議院口頭表決通過；2010/09/27，國會期中選舉前的會期最後一天，參議院院會未經辯論、十分安靜地無異議閃電通過該案，引發許多公民團體與媒體激烈抗議，2010/10/08美國總統將該案退回眾議院。（國會已休會，總統其實在法定期限內不簽署，執行pocket veto即可，退回是提高姿態。美國對於總統否決、退回提案議院的法案，國會可依法定程序復議，若經兩院三分之二多數同意推翻總統之否決，該法案不需總統簽署即可生效）
2010/10/14–美國50個州開始聯合調查房地產抵押貸款產業，要查證外界數年來所屢屢指稱的「銀行業未經確實檢視相關文件即進行、甚至偽造文件來進行房屋法拍程序」是否屬實？
2012/02/09–美國最大的5家房貸服務商與美國聯邦政府及49個州（除了Oklahoma）達成National Mortgage Settlement：被告為了解決包括在法拍訴訟中robo-signed債務人證言、在提供房貸修改方案時有欺騙行為、在申請法拍前未提供債務人可以避免法拍的選擇（許多房貸有政府機構FHA保險）、提供不適當的文件給聯邦破產法庭等違反聯邦與各州法律的問題，除了在未來將遵守新的抵押貸款服務標準外，還按各家房貸服務商的市場佔有率，分3年合計支付250億美元（Bank of America 118億、Wells Fargo 54億、JPMorgan
Chase 53億、Citigroup 22億、Ally 3.1億）：
j 200億用來為房貸債務人舒困
為房貸餘額高於房屋市價（under water）的債務人提供至少100億元房貸本金折讓、提供至少30億元降低利率；其餘約70億美元用於為失業債務人提供本金償還寬限期（forbearance of principal）、提供住宅賠售與過度期協助、贊助住宅暨社區反衰敗計畫、或其他舒困方案。
k 50億以現金給付聯邦與各州政府
以15億元現金給付在2008/01/01~2011/12/31之間住宅遭到法拍的債務人（每戶可能獲得$1,500~$2,000）；其餘35億元用來償付政府針對房貸不當行為之辦案費用、資助民間房貸顧問、資助房貸法律扶助與其他類似之公共服務活動
。
政府並設立Office of Mortgage Settlement
Oversight持續追踪稽核這5家銀行執行National Mortgage Settlement的績效，公開發佈稽核報告。
2013/12/19–Consumer Financial Protection Bureau發佈新聞，政府查弊機構已與美國最大的非銀行扺押貸款服務商Ocwen Financial
Corporation、及其子公司
Ocwen Loan Servicing達成協議，向法院申請執行命令：Ocwen提供20億美元為under water債務人折讓房貸本金、提供1.25億美元補償給大約185,000位房屋已被法拍的債務人、遵守新的抵押貸款服務標準。
（本文觀點：在CDO熱時有抵押房貸製造工廠mortgage mills，在熱潮過去房價回跌時，就會有法拍製造工廠foreclosure
mills）
（本文觀點：在次貸風暴爆發5年半後，公民團體與本屆政府終於讓罪魁禍首之一的銀行們吐了點錢出來！咦，上市銀行們所吐出的錢是從那裡來的？是公司所有股東支付的，這些股東大多對於犯罪行為不知情啊！這些罰款是要從存款人與借款人身上擠出來的啊！加害人繳付的賠償金是要「再」從受害人身上搾出來的啊！）
（本文觀點：
1. 犯罪的是法人，所以處罰法人就好。
錯！法人的行為能力從自然人來；自然人利用法人犯罪、或疏忽職守致使法人犯罪，應一併處罰應負責的自然人，這種做法才合理。
2. 罰金對社會才有實益，收到罰金比較重要。
罰金是重要，但在現代金融市場的生態中，只罰上市公司錢，對應負責的自然人是不痛不癢的，他們自己間接的財務減損不大。股東們放縱所僱用、或所授權委託、或所追隨的經營者犯罪，分攤一點罰款還說得過去；但應該一併處罰直接犯罪或疏忽職守的自然人）
修改房貸契約的表現
下面5個表1個圖摘自2013年12月美國Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency所發佈的2013年第3季OCC Mortgage
Metrics Report。
1. 下表顯示從2012年第3季到2013年第3季共5季，每季房貸合約修正方式的次數分佈：除了將欠費資本化外，用得最多的方式是降低利率，其次是延長合約年期。約90%（OCC報告表52）的合約調整會組合不同的修正方式。
|
Changes in Loan Terms for Modifications
Through the Third Quarter of 2013
| |||||||
|
(Percentage of Total Modifications in Each
Category)
| |||||||
|
|
9/30/12
|
12/31/12
|
3/31/13
|
6/30/13
|
9/30/13
|
1Q
%Change |
1Y
%Change |
|
Capitalization
|
88.20%
|
84.60%
|
79.30%
|
81.70%
|
83.60%
|
2.30%
|
-5.30%
|
|
Rate Reduction
|
77.10%
|
73.30%
|
80.10%
|
81.00%
|
78.90%
|
-2.60%
|
2.30%
|
|
Rate Freeze
|
7.10%
|
3.90%
|
3.70%
|
5.20%
|
5.50%
|
5.00%
|
-22.90%
|
|
Term Extension
|
64.90%
|
58.90%
|
60.30%
|
67.70%
|
69.30%
|
2.40%
|
6.70%
|
|
Principal Reduction
|
17.20%
|
20.00%
|
15.20%
|
12.20%
|
13.60%
|
11.90%
|
-20.80%
|
|
Principal Deferral
|
19.00%
|
20.50%
|
18.20%
|
20.50%
|
25.30%
|
23.50%
|
33.30%
|
|
Not Reported*
|
0.40%
|
1.10%
|
0.60%
|
1.40%
|
2.20%
|
57.00%
|
487.80%
|
|
(Number of Changes in Each Category)
| |||||||
|
Capitalization
|
120,456
|
121,454
|
109,882
|
88,418
|
82,998
|
-6.10%
|
-31.10%
|
|
Rate Reduction
|
105,256
|
105,115
|
110,910
|
87,639
|
78,309
|
-10.60%
|
-25.60%
|
|
Rate Freeze
|
9655
|
5644
|
5121
|
5619
|
5413
|
-3.70%
|
-43.90%
|
|
Term Extension
|
88,657
|
84,518
|
83,594
|
73,254
|
68,820
|
-6.10%
|
-22.40%
|
|
Principal Reduction
|
23451
|
28765
|
21033
|
13150
|
13502
|
2.70%
|
-42.40%
|
|
Principal Deferral
|
25,945
|
29,445
|
25,272
|
22,195
|
25,150
|
13.30%
|
-3.10%
|
|
Not Reported*
|
504
|
1,599
|
900
|
1,496
|
2,155
|
44.10%
|
327.60%
|
|
*Processing constraints at some servicers prevented
them from reporting specific modified term(s).
| |||||||
2. 修改合約前後每月還本付息金額差異的百分比。降低20%以上的最多
|
Changes in Monthly Principal and Interest
Payments Resulting From Modifications
| |||||||
|
(Percentage of Modifications in Each
Category)*
| |||||||
|
|
9/30/12
|
12/31/12
|
3/31/13
|
6/30/13
|
9/30/13
|
1Q
%Change |
1Y
%Change |
|
Decreased by 20% or More
|
54.30%
|
58.90%
|
56.40%
|
59.20%
|
62.50%
|
5.70%
|
15.20%
|
|
Decreased by 10% to Less Than 20%
|
20.20%
|
21.00%
|
24.10%
|
21.40%
|
18.80%
|
-12.20%
|
-6.70%
|
|
Decreased by Less Than 10%
|
15.00%
|
13.40%
|
13.20%
|
12.40%
|
11.10%
|
-10.60%
|
-26.00%
|
|
Subtotal for Decreased
|
89.50%
|
93.40%
|
93.70%
|
93.00%
|
92.40%
|
-0.60%
|
3.30%
|
|
Unchanged
|
4.30%
|
1.00%
|
0.90%
|
1.00%
|
0.80%
|
-23.60%
|
-81.30%
|
|
Increased
|
6.30%
|
5.70%
|
5.40%
|
6.00%
|
6.80%
|
13.60%
|
8.00%
|
|
Subtotal for Unchanged and Increased
|
10.50%
|
6.60%
|
6.30%
|
7.00%
|
7.60%
|
8.00%
|
-28.20%
|
|
Total
|
100.00%
|
100.00%
|
100.00%
|
100.00%
|
100.00%
|
|
|
|
(Number of Modifications in Each Category)
| |||||||
|
Decreased by 20% or More
|
73,854
|
84,103
|
77,674
|
63,515
|
61,307
|
-3.50%
|
-17.00%
|
|
Decreased by 10% to Less Than 20%
|
27,434
|
30,056
|
33,143
|
23,005
|
18,443
|
-19.80%
|
-32.80%
|
|
Decreased by Less Than 10%
|
20,397
|
19,169
|
18,187
|
13,323
|
10,876
|
-18.40%
|
-46.70%
|
|
Subtotal for Decreased
|
121,685
|
133,328
|
129,004
|
99,843
|
90,626
|
-9.20%
|
-25.50%
|
|
Unchanged
|
5,812
|
1,404
|
1,229
|
1,124
|
784
|
-30.20%
|
-86.50%
|
|
Increased
|
8,531
|
8,080
|
7,389
|
6,405
|
6,644
|
3.70%
|
-22.10%
|
|
Subtotal for Unchanged and Increased
|
14,343
|
9,484
|
8,618
|
7,529
|
7,428
|
-1.30%
|
-48.20%
|
|
Total
|
136,028
|
142,812
|
137,622
|
107,372
|
98,054
|
-8.70%
|
-27.90%
|
|
* No payment change information was reported on 481
modifications in the third quarter of 2012, 683 in the fourth quarter of
2012, 927 in the first quarter of 2013, 823 in the second quarter of 2013,
and 1,239 in the third quarter of 2013.
| |||||||
3. 修改合約前後每月還本付息金額的差異。HAMP比其他方案要多減少10%左右。
|
Average Change in Monthly Payments
Resulting From Modifications, by Quarter*
| |||||||
|
All Modifications
| |||||||
|
|
9/30/12
|
12/31/12
|
3/31/13
|
6/30/13
|
9/30/13
|
1Q
%Change |
1Y
%Change |
|
Decreased by 20% or More
|
-566
|
-594
|
-560
|
-545
|
-535
|
-1.80%
|
-5.40%
|
|
Decreased by 10% to Less Than 20%
|
-179
|
-189
|
-186
|
-172
|
-176
|
2.30%
|
-1.50%
|
|
Decreased by Less Than 10%
|
-65
|
-68
|
-71
|
-68
|
-67
|
-0.70%
|
4.10%
|
|
Unchanged
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
|
|
Increased**
|
131
|
169
|
166
|
159
|
159
|
-0.10%
|
21.40%
|
|
Overall (in dollars)
|
-345
|
-389
|
-361
|
-358
|
-365
|
1.80%
|
5.70%
|
|
Percentage Change
|
-23.80%
|
-25.80%
|
-25.20%
|
-25.90%
|
-26.60%
|
|
|
|
Other Modifications
| |||||||
|
Decreased by 20% or More
|
-498
|
-560
|
-517
|
-519
|
-505
|
-2.60%
|
1.40%
|
|
Decreased by 10% to Less Than 20%
|
-173
|
-186
|
-183
|
-168
|
-171
|
1.70%
|
-1.60%
|
|
Decreased by Less Than 10%
|
-63
|
-67
|
-70
|
-66
|
-65
|
-1.60%
|
3.70%
|
|
Unchanged
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
|
|
Increased**
|
125
|
168
|
165
|
158
|
159
|
0.60%
|
27.00%
|
|
Overall (in dollars)
|
-278
|
-345
|
-315
|
-327
|
-330
|
1.00%
|
18.80%
|
|
Percentage Change
|
-20.30%
|
-23.40%
|
-22.70%
|
-24.20%
|
-24.90%
|
|
|
|
HAMP Modifications
| |||||||
|
Decreased by 20% or More
|
-705
|
-687
|
-676
|
-642
|
-635
|
-1.10%
|
-9.90%
|
|
Decreased by 10% to Less Than 20%
|
-212
|
-208
|
-212
|
-213
|
-209
|
-1.90%
|
-1.80%
|
|
Decreased by Less Than 10%
|
-77
|
-78
|
-77
|
-82
|
-80
|
-1.60%
|
3.70%
|
|
Unchanged
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
|
|
Increased**
|
194
|
191
|
191
|
182
|
163
|
-10.50%
|
|
|
Overall (in dollars)
|
-567
|
-558
|
-547
|
-517
|
-509
|
-1.60%
|
-10.20%
|
|
Percentage Change
|
-35.30%
|
-35.40%
|
-34.90%
|
-34.10%
|
-33.80%
|
|
|
4. 本文匯總了OCC報告表35到表40的Total部份成為下表–從2008年開始，每年貸款合約修改後再違約的比例。違約比例逐年減少。
|
Re-Default Rates of Loans Modified in 2008
by Change in Payment
| |||||
|
(60 or More Days Delinquent)
| |||||
|
|
6
Months
After Modification |
12 Months
After Modification |
18 Months
After Modification |
24
Months
After Modification |
36 Months
After Modification |
|
2008
|
44.50%
|
57.00%
|
62.00%
|
62.70%
|
61.40%
|
|
2009
|
32.20%
|
43.20%
|
46.50%
|
47.00%
|
45.10%
|
|
2010
|
17.30%
|
25.40%
|
29.50%
|
30.60%
|
29.30%
|
|
2011
|
15.40%
|
23.20%
|
26.60%
|
27.10%
|
|
|
2012
|
12.70%
|
18.90%
|
22.40%
|
|
|
|
2013
|
11.60%
|
|
|
|
|
（本文觀點：在戰術層面應該要進一步運用因子分析了解為什麼會有這樣的變化，否則不僅戰地接戰技術無法精進，也會從根本面影響戰略能力的精進
）
5. 下表顯示從2008年初開始，歷年接受修改合約的房貸，在2013/09/30的情況。整體來說，到2013年第二季末共有3,288,717件房貸（仍在90天試行期內的合約未計入）修改合約，這些修改後的合約到第三季末有（42.6%＋2.9%）45.5%正常履約、6.30%遲繳30~59天…；參加HAMP的履約情況比没有參加的好…
|
Status of Mortgages Modified in 2008–2Q
2013
| ||||||||
|
|
Total
|
Current
|
30–59
Days Delinquent |
Seriously
Delinquent |
Foreclosures
in Process |
Completed
Foreclosures |
Paid Off
|
No Longer
in the Portfolio* |
|
2008
|
443,294
|
21.10%
|
4.30%
|
9.20%
|
5.40%
|
16.70%
|
4.50%
|
38.90%
|
|
2009
|
593,884
|
31.20%
|
5.30%
|
11.50%
|
6.20%
|
12.70%
|
4.10%
|
28.90%
|
|
2010
|
955,422
|
40.00%
|
5.90%
|
11.00%
|
5.50%
|
8.20%
|
3.10%
|
26.20%
|
|
2011
|
569,553
|
47.40%
|
6.60%
|
12.30%
|
5.50%
|
4.00%
|
2.40%
|
21.70%
|
|
2012
|
479,820
|
61.50%
|
8.00%
|
12.30%
|
3.90%
|
0.90%
|
1.20%
|
12.20%
|
|
2013
|
246,744
|
70.40%
|
8.90%
|
9.40%
|
1.20%
|
0.10%
|
0.50%
|
9.50%
|
|
Total
|
3,288,717
|
42.60%
|
6.30%
|
11.10%
|
5.10%
|
7.80%
|
2.90%
|
24.30%
|
|
HAMP Modification Performance Compared With
Other Modifications**
| ||||||||
|
Other
Modifications |
1,774,830
|
46.20%
|
7.30%
|
13.30%
|
5.50%
|
6.30%
|
2.80%
|
18.60%
|
|
HAMP
Modifications |
732,747
|
53.80%
|
5.40%
|
7.20%
|
3.30%
|
3.40%
|
1.70%
|
25.30%
|
|
Modifications That Reduced Payments by 10
Percent or More
| ||||||||
|
2,083,687
|
48.70%
|
6.30%
|
9.60%
|
4.10%
|
5.20%
|
2.10%
|
23.90%
| |
|
Modifications That Reduced Payments by Less
Than 10 Percent
| ||||||||
|
1,205,030
|
31.90%
|
6.20%
|
13.80%
|
6.70%
|
12.10%
|
4.20%
|
25.00%
| |
|
*Processing constraints prevented some servicers from
reporting the reason for removal from the portfolio.
| ||||||||
|
**Modifications used to compare with HAMP modifications
include only modifications implemented from
the third
quarter of 2009 through the second quarter of 2013.
| ||||||||
6. OCC Mortgage Metrics Report的調查母體包括了選出來的全國性銀行與兩房之一，總資產池資產價值佔全美國第一順位房屋抵押貸款的50%。就調查母體而言，在2013/09/30共有25,643,169筆貸款、總貸款餘額4,357,767百萬美元（4.36兆），其中prime、Alt-A、subprime的佔比如下圖。
Prime佔比增加的原因是許多低品質貸款已違約出場、次貸風暴後新的放款prime比例提高、還有一些subprime被賣給「没有報告」的服務商。大家都懂得如何閱讀報告。
如何區隔借款人資格（差別財務能力與信用…）與服務水準（差別利率與年期…）來極大化收益（不同年期…）？營利事業與政府組織追求的目標有何不同？如何取得最適平衡？風暴過後，在這方面能有更深刻的認知，帶動政府法律與企業規章的興革，才是經一事長一智。
美國政府對於可能法拍戶的舒困方案成功嗎？
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